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Abstract: This article revisits claims about the relationship between ‘standardisation’,
‘discretion’ and ‘accountability’ in youth justice made in the wake of the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998. We argue that less centralisation and less standardisation have
transformed accountability, but this is experienced differently according to the place held
in the organisational hierarchy. This recognition demands a more nuanced understanding
of ‘practitioner discretion’, which can account for differences between managerial and
frontline experiences of what we describe as ‘janus-faced youth justice work’, and a broad
definition of the youth justice field and associated actors.
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Following the introduction of the principles and techniques of new pub-
lic management (NPM) to public sector agencies in England and Wales
from the 1980s, there has been considerable discussion of their impact
on what has since become known as ‘youth justice’ practice.1 For some,
and particularly the architects of the ‘new’ youth justice system intro-
duced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA 1998), a pragmatic,
‘neo-bureaucratic’ adaptation of NPM was seen as the solution to the
‘problems’ of a previous generation – a lack of practitioner accountabil-
ity, lack of clarity about ‘what worked’ when intervening in the lives of
young people in trouble with the law, and a lack of consistency when re-
sponding to the misdemeanours of the young (Audit Commission 1996;
Home Office 1997; see McLaughlin, Muncie and Hughes (2001) for dis-
cussion). Critics were concerned, however, that more directive ‘National
Standards’ for youth justice work undermined ‘effective practice’ by re-
stricting practitioner creativity, autonomy anddiscretion (for example, Pitts
2001).
This article re-engages with these concerns at a time of apparent change.
Drawing on qualitative interviews with 71 youth justice practitioners2 and
managers, collected at two sites in England, we discuss two apparently
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contradictory narratives within our data. First, most participants were
keen to tell us about significant recent changes that had taken place at
work, including: organisational transformations, such as restructuring and
integration in the face of significant budget cuts; completely new areas of
work following the launch of new initiatives and the integration of services
(at one research site); and new processes, such as new forms of assessment
for expanding ‘pre-court’ work not governed by National Standards for
Youth Justice Services (Youth Justice Board 2013) (all discussed below);
and increasingly important relationships with local political actors and the
declining significance of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales
(YJB) (see also Kelly and Armitage 2015; Phoenix 2016). Second, our par-
ticipants also told us that, despite this, aspects of their work remained
identifiably the same.
These claims could coexist because it was common for practitioners to
make a clear distinction between two core aspects of their job. On one
hand, ‘frontline’ roles involved regular reporting of information (that is,
the ‘paperwork’). On the other hand, frontline practitioners worked di-
rectly with young people and families (‘face-to-face’ work or, for some,
‘the real work’). This aspect of the job involved building relationships
in ways that were largely uncaptured by performance management sys-
tems which recorded ‘contacts’,3 tasks undertaken and decisions made,
but not the interactional techniques used to secure the ‘negotiated con-
nection’ that enabled the completion of the work or the qualities of the
associated relationships (Drake, Fergusson and Briggs 2014, p.31; see also
Prior and Mason 2010). As a consequence, the experience of ‘face-to-face
work’ was judged to be relatively unaffected by change, despite new ‘pa-
perwork’ – and in some cases, differing caseloads – particularly in areas
of work unregulated by National Standards and where assessment docu-
ments were not centrally determined (Ministry of Justice and Youth Jus-
tice Board 2013). Despite the relaxing of reporting requirements by the
YJB (Youth Justice Board 2011, pp.4–5), frontline practitioners also de-
scribed considerable continuity in demands for information from their
management teams. Similarly, while the need to ‘manage up’ and ‘man-
age down’ remained constant for managers, the declining importance of
the central bureaucracy (and a decline in central funding) at a time of
local budget constraints, produced new pressures and new drivers for
change.
This article reflects upon these accounts of the day-to-day realities of
youth justice work. We argue that three factors have together encour-
aged ‘janus-faced youth justice work’: (i) the embedding of managerialist
priorities and approaches within local bureaucracies; (ii) the local political
implications of post-2008 austeritymeasures; and (iii) threats to forms of in-
formal support in the face of organisational retrenchment/reorganisation.
Significantly, however, this takes different forms depending on the loca-
tion of the worker within the occupational hierarchy, and it has been di-
rectly affected by changing relationships between the central and local
bureaucracies in youth justice, and central and local government more
broadly. This causes us to revisit claims about the relationship between
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‘standardisation’, ‘discretion’ and ‘accountability’ in youth justice made in
the wake of the CDA 1998. We argue that changing relationships between
central and local government highlight the importance of local bureau-
cratic hierarchies and occupational cultures in shaping everyday decision
making and the prioritisation of tasks – where work remains governed
by National Standards (Youth Justice Board 2013), but also in new, less
regulated areas of work. This recognition demands a more nuanced un-
derstanding of ‘practitioner discretion’ which can account for differences
between ‘managerial’ and ‘frontline’ experiences, and a broader definition
of the youth justice field and associated actors than recent youth justice
scholarship has commonly suggested.
Methodology
This article is based on findings from a study, funded by the Economic
and Social Research Council, which explored the implementation of youth
justice policy in England through an examination of practitioner sense-
making. The research comprised a study of youth offending services at
two case study sites, with the primary data collection undertaken between
December 2012 and September 2013, with a variety of youth justice prac-
titioners. The researchers undertook focus groups with practitioners at
each site, involving managers, officers and workers (n = 44). The main
body of the data collection comprised in-depth qualitative interviews with
71 practitioners (Site A = 31, Site B = 40) ranging from the Heads of Ser-
vice at each site through to officers, preventions workers and performance
managers. The interviews averaged one hour and three people were in-
terviewed twice. We have broadly indicated participants’ roles below using
job titles and descriptions of the role given in the interviews. For the sake
of simplicity, we used the most appropriate of three categories: practi-
tioner, manager, and senior manager. We have indicated the site except
where only few participants held identified roles and the argument is not
affected.
The sites were originally identified because they were relatively au-
tonomous ‘teams’ with histories of challenging YJB policies. In the inter-
ests of confidentiality the sites will hereafter be referred to as ‘Site A’ and
‘Site B’. The organisation at Site A took a form based on that established by
the CDA 1998: a multi-disciplinary teammade up of social workers, proba-
tion officers, police officers and specialists in other areas, including health
and education. The service was divided into pre- and post-court teams,
the latter of which dealt with statutory orders while the former dealt with
pre-court orders and wider prevention programmes/schemes. In Site B
the local authority had subsumed youth justice services into a broader ser-
vice responsible for young people’s offending, employment, and welfare
issues more widely. The ‘integrated’ set-up in Site B meant that youth jus-
tice work was largely undertaken by staff trained in youth justice but some
of the lower-level youth offending and preventions work was undertaken
by practitioners from a range of professional backgrounds, such as youth
work or Connexions.
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A New ‘New Youth Justice’
The ‘new youth justice’ (Goldson 2000) introduced in England and Wales
by the CDA 1998 can be located in a longer tradition of NPM in the pub-
lic services, in which the founding of the Audit Commission and National
Audit Office in 1983 are significant markers. A focus on results and the
centralised auditing of ‘effectiveness’ (in addition to the already established
work of the inspectorates) meant that the number of people employed in
managerial roles grew, and their reliance on data generated by those work-
ing directly with clients to make and justify spending decisions changed
existing frontline roles by restricting discretion and producing new de-
mands for information (Clarke and Newman 1997). Indeed, limiting the
ability of practitioners to make decisions that might threaten the ‘efficient’
deployment of resources can be understood as reflective of amove to an ap-
proachmore concerned with the allocation of resources and system efficacy
than meeting needs (Kemshall et al. 1997), and as part of a ‘fundamental
assault’ on professional cultures (McLaughlin, Muncie and Hughes 2001,
p.303).
The New Labour government elected in 1997 had distanced them-
selves from Conservative public sector marketisation and their rhetorical
emphasis on ‘more’ law and order, emphasising instead communitarian
values and greater attention to the ‘causes of crime’ (McLaughlin, Muncie
and Hughes 2001). However, the commitment to an ‘audit culture’ re-
mained embedded in their political strategies, albeit in a hybridised ‘neo-
bureaucratic’ form which combined rule-adherence with the outsourcing
of the regulatory functions performed by hierarchical management in tra-
ditional bureaucracies (Harrison and Smith 2003). Of central importance
to promoting ‘effective’ and ‘consistent’ practice was the newly created
YJB, a quasi-governmental organisation authorised to draft national stan-
dards for youth justice work; approve annual youth justice plans; and, with
the Audit Commission and professional inspectorates, monitor the perfor-
mance of multi-agency youth offending teams (YOTs) (Souhami 2007).
While National Standards for processes and procedures that must be fol-
lowed when ‘doing’ probation work had been developed from the 1990s,
they became more directive following the CDA 1998 and the development
of separate standards for workers in the new multi-agency YOTs (Youth
Justice Board 2000). As Eadie and Canton (2002) observed: ‘[s]ignificantly,
the language of the Standards for Youth Justice has changed from “should”
to “must”’ (p.16).
Standardised risk assessment tools, Asset and Onset, were introduced
from 2003 (see Baker (2005) for discussion and Case and Haines (2015)
for a summary of critiques). The YJB also held funds for evaluative re-
search, and the ‘Key Elements of Effective Practice’ documents derived
from YJB-commissioned research and research reviews formed the ba-
sis of new National Qualifications Framework, centring on a Professional
Certificate in Effective Practice developed in partnership with the YJB
(see Hester 2010). While some argued that there is ‘no inherent contra-
diction between good, consistent service delivery and wide (though not
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unbounded) discretion’ (Eadie and Canton 2002, p.14), post-CDA 1998
attempts to standardise youth justice processes and delineate the youth
justice knowledge base were seen by others as an overtly political act and an
assault on professional independence. Pitts (2001), for example, represents
the ‘pursuit of homogeneity’ within youth justice as part of a broader ‘quest
for congruence’ between a populist criminal justice agenda and potentially
oppositional practice cultures, which amounted to the ‘zombification’ of
youth justice.
However, as Lipsky (1980), in his classic study of street-level bureau-
crats argued, ‘discretion’ can be understood as a necessary element of
frontline roles in public services, since even the most robust rule structure
requires actors to choose a course of action and choose between rules.
In other words care should be taken ‘not to confuse the presence of
rules with determinacy’ (Evans and Harris 2004, p.891). Rules may re-
strict the permitted options and provide criteria to guide choice, but they
do not preclude illegitimate action or ensure choices made reflect those
intended by designers. Eadie and Canton’s (2002) model engages with
this issue by considering ‘discretion’ alongside the concept of ‘accountabil-
ity’. They propose four practice ‘quadrants’ with high/low discretion and
high/low accountability in each. They suggest that the CDA 1998 and the
2000 National Standards (Youth Justice Board 2000) introduced higher
accountability which could be consistent with ‘best practice’, but only if
high accountability is coupled with high discretion. They warn, however,
that ‘rigid application of the rules’ and ‘increased standardisation’ is the
‘wrong strategy’ leading to ‘constrained practice’ (Eadie and Canton 2002,
p.24).
Clearly, assessments of the desirability of standardisation of practice can
be analysed on their own terms, and the youth justice practice literature
has explored how, when, and why, practitioners choose to subvert or ‘re-
sist’ National Standards, tools and processes (for example, Baker 2005;
Canton and Eadie 2008; Hughes 2009; Bateman 2011). Our concern is
rather different. The introduction of multi-agency YOTs by the CDA 1998
encouraged a number of empirical studies at the organisational level (for
example, Burnett and Appleton 2004; Souhami 2007; Field 2007), but
as Phoenix (2016) discusses, recently dominant approaches within youth
criminology have tended to flatten ‘the complexity (and the specificity) of
the social relations that make up the youth penal realm’ (p.136). Recent
dramatic reductions in the numbers of young people receiving a repri-
mand, final warning or conviction for the first time (‘first time entrants’),
numbers of young people sentenced in court and numbers of young people
in custody, and a political context in which aspects of the current approach
to youth justice work are being questioned (Carlile 2014; Taylor 2016)
have again prompted new interest in the local functioning of youth jus-
tice organisations (for example, Drake, Fergusson and Briggs 2014; Smith
2014; Byrne and Brooks 2015; Morris 2015). In what follows, we demon-
strate howdecoupling the issues of: (i) ‘standardisation’ and ‘centralisation’;
and (ii) ‘managerial’ and ‘practitioner’ discretion, enables analysis of how
changing relationships between the central and local bureaucracy in youth
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justice have impacted on power relations and perceptions of accountability
within local organisations.
Decentralisation and (Managerial) Discretion
Since the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition govern-
ment in 2010, the need to promote more localised responses has been em-
phasised within policy statements (for example, Ministry of Justice 2012).
There have been some significant changes to the local criminal justice land-
scape, such as the introduction of elected Police and Crime Commissioners
(House of Commons 2016), a departure from national-level monitoring
reflected by the dismantling of the Audit Commission (HM Government
2014) and a failed attempt to dismantle the YJB and move its functions
to the Ministry of Justice (see Souhami 2015). While the YJB continues to
centrally administer the youth justice system, there is a greater emphasis
on practitioner discretion within what the YJB (Youth Justice Board 2011)
has recently described as a changing local delivery landscape, ‘with more
local accountability and decision-making’ (p.5).
Souhami (2015) considered how the central bureaucratic organisation,
the YJB, functioned and interacted with local bureaucracies as part of her
broad project. She describes how the YJB, with comparatively few direct
mechanisms for influencing local YOTs, extended their informal influence
(firmly framed as ‘support’) via YOT-appointed ‘regional monitors’, tasked
with ‘validating’ extensive case-level data collected with the aim of improv-
ing practice, and ‘practice improvement consultants’, with the remit to act
directly on that knowledge to shape local practices and improve outcomes
(Souhami 2015, p.162). She argues that this went considerably beyond the
aggregate-level performance monitoring that the YJB needed to advise
the Home Secretary and fulfil its statutory function, resulting instead in
‘the extension of central surveillance and intervention’ and the ‘enlisting
[of] YOTs and local authorities into their own self-regulation’ (Souhami
2015, p.162).
Despite this, senior managers at both our research sites claimed to be
innovating prior to any official departure from a centralised youth justice
system following the election of the Coalition government:
I think the Youth Justice Board would like to think that they were telling us what
to do but actually they threw an awful lot of money at Youth Justice Services across
the country . . . . To be fair to them they would try and identify good practice and
work up a kind of template for others to follow. (Senior Manager)
As Souhami (2015, p.161) acknowledges, the YJB allocated a percentage of
YOT funding (about 20% in 2006) but was disinclined to act on the threat
to withdraw this, given the likely impact on services. Our research suggests
that both sites felt able to act in counter-hegemonic ways by remaining
within what Lipsky (1980) describes as the ‘rule structure’ of the central bu-
reaucracy: improved outcomes from counter-hegemonic approaches still
satisfy relevant performance indicators. For example, the introduction of
pre-court interventions at both the studied sites reflects a national swing
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towards increased diversion from court, a change that had been encour-
aged by revised performance indicators and established before there was a
legislative framework in place (Bateman 2014; Smith 2014).4 Our data sim-
ilarly suggest that the policy emphasis on decentralised decision making
appears to be reflecting and further enabling, rather than driving, change,
although we were told that the change of government in 2010 made the
exercise of local discretion ‘much more acceptable’ to the YJB.
The importance of agentic senior managers to local youth justice is also
illuminated by responses to a question we commonly asked participants
from all levels of both services – whether they believed there was a coherent
vision driving recent developments in their service. Responses were varied
across sites and between sites, but senior managers were often believed
to have been responsible for significant changes. Some themes stood out.
First, as noted, a desire to avoid ‘unnecessary’ criminalisation and, instead,
provide ‘supportive’ pre-court interventions, was commonly identified as
an overarching rationale for service provision at both sites (see Kelly and
Armitage (2015) for discussion). Second, in addition to these new, locally-
developed interventions, senior management teams had recently altered
service structures (radically, in the case of the integrated service) and in-
troduced wholly new areas of work.5 Practitioner experiences at Site A and
Site B were very different, but changes at both sites were commonly under-
stood to relate to the specific ways in which local senior management teams
adapted to the significant budget cuts that had affected all local authority
services following the financial crash of 2008 and the so-called ‘austerity
measures’ introduced by the Coalition government (for example, Innes
and Tetlow 2015):
I think it [the move to an integrated service] was primarily money driven and then
maybe secondary driven by better outcomes for young people. (Practitioner, Site B)
When I started there was three times as many people sat upstairs there really was.
And people have left due to retirement and you know illness and things like that and
then the Council obviously tried to make cutbacks so people took early retirement.
(Practitioner, Site A)
Nobody can say why it is we’re not advertising the job until October other than to
potentially save money. (Practitioner, Site A)
Our data, therefore, suggest that ‘managerial discretion’ is not only en-
couraged in the current political context, but seems to have been more
discretely in operation prior to the ‘official’ push towards greater decen-
tralisation by the YJB. This appears to reflect studies which have discussed
tendencies towards the local restructuring of youth offending services (for
example, Fielder, Hart and Shaw 2008; Youth Justice Board 2015) and
more recent discussions about the importance of occupational cultures in
shaping the interpretation of policy (Byrne and Brooks 2015; Field 2015;
Morris 2015; Souhami 2015). However, the assumption that increased
managerial discretion means increased (frontline) practitioner discretion,
or that managerial discretion is unconstrained under decentralised condi-
tions both require greater scrutiny.
484
C© 2016 The Howard League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Howard Journal Vol 55 No 4. December 2016
ISSN 2059-1098, pp. 478–495
Embedded Managerialism
Together, strategic decisions to retrench, reorganise and develop non-
statutory pre-court interventions have brought considerable changes to the
front line. Fewer young people processed by the courts means less statu-
tory youth justice work, although those in the remaining cohort have more
complex needs (see also Carlile 2014), while new pre-court interventions
and new areas of work with children and young people not in trouble with
the law require associated practitioners to become familiar with new assess-
ments and other forms of ‘paperwork’. Practitioner experiences differed at
the research sites. At Site A, practitioners were divided into ‘post-court’ and
‘pre-court’ teams, but some workers in the new integrated service at Site
B managed both informal, non-statutory interventions and court orders
(see also Kelly and Armitage 2015). In addition to these changes however,
we were also told of considerable continuities, where job titles or routes
into YOT services might have changed, but much of the work undertaken
remained very similar.
We came to understand contemporary youth justice work at the front
line as ‘janus-faced’, involving ‘looking up’ to managers, but also ‘look-
ing across’ to the children and families who made up a case manager’s
or worker’s caseload. These empirical observations are not new: the dif-
ficulties associated with balancing ‘relational’ and ‘instrumental’ aspects
of professional practice have been explored in relation to youth justice
(for example, Prior and Mason 2010; Drake, Fergusson and Briggs 2014;
Morris 2015) and social and probation work carried out in non-youth
justice settings (for example, Broadhurst et al. 2010; Mawby and Worrall
2013). We were, nonetheless, surprised to learn that the majority of our in-
terview participants claimed that they spent between 50% and 80% of their
time doing ‘paperwork’, with time available for direct work with children
and young people subsequently under pressure:
Careworks is the base rate so everything revolves round it. So all the reports, all the
assessments, every telephone call we make has to be logged on there. So telephone
calls, emails, every conversation, every meeting with a young person, every meeting
with, you know, their social worker, everything is recorded onCareworks . . . .When
I first started . . . Careworks didn’t exist and now it is one of the over-riding things
that we spend most of our time looking at. (Practitioner, Site B)
I think ten years ago we had more time to spend with young people and families.
I think now with the increase of more paperwork, the lack of staff and the lack
of resources, changes in legislation which then introduced more paperwork with
more government incentives that you’ve got to do more for. I would say now that
70%, at least a minimum of 70%, is paperwork and data inputting where before at
least there was a good balance. (Practitioner, Site A)
While some accepted this aspect of their working lives, others expressed
real frustration or a sense of weariness. Often this was because practitioners
felt there was an inverse relationship between time available for young
people and time spent on paperwork:
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I prefer to be out, you know, I’d like to go do an assessment, I’d like to spend three
hours with a young person but I think ‘I’ve spent three hours, it’s going to take six
hours, seven hours to put that on the system’, even just if you met them down the
town or something and got talking but you have to input it. (Practitioner, Site A)
While a number of workers found aspects of the ‘paperwork’ (particularly
assessments) supported their work with young people, and a few workers
believed that the recording systems could be usefully used to ‘self-audit’
their work, a sense of frustration was also bred of a view that ‘the paper-
work’ was more about monitoring them as individual practitioners rather
than their ‘practice’ and was based on distrust. While a number of workers
identified work with young people as the ‘real work’ and as more impor-
tant, they felt the service (and for some, themselves as workers) were held
to account for the other aspect of their role:
We’re constantly told if it’s not written down it didn’t happen, well in my opinion
it did happen – I was there. I’ve done something meaningful . . . just because I
haven’t recorded it in a specific place does that mean it’s any less valuable? You can
get practitioners who spend 90% of the time in front of a computer and haven’t
got the time or the patience or the energy to be investing in the young person to
make the changes. And on paper they look fantastic, but in reality does the paper
reflect the reality of a situation? (Practitioner, Site A)
I’m not into it for ticking the boxes. I know I’ve got to do it but my prime focus
with every case, and I will justify why certain boxes aren’t ticked, is to work with
young people. (Practitioner, Site B)
Individualised Perceptions of Liability
Analysing the full range of responses about the usefulness of ‘paperwork’
(especially when this overly-broad term was disaggregated into discrete
tasks)6 and its connections to the ‘face-to-face work’ is too complex for this
article. In many ways, our research reflects earlier evaluations of standard-
ised assessment tools (for example, Baker 2005; Wilson and Hinks 2011)
in that it shows practitioners report using these in different ways – from
strict adherence to effective dismissal of available guidance. However, while
there was some flexibility in the way tools were used, there was little space
to refuse to use them at all. Even practitioners who felt ‘paperwork’ made
little difference to their work with young people tended to acknowledged
the importance of an ‘audit trail’, and few overall could imagine a situation
in which record-keeping was reduced. In a phrase we heard particularly
at Site A – ‘if it isn’t recorded, it didn’t happen’.
We were told that records were important to allow the transfer of cases,
for example in the case of staff illness. Some of those interviewed, however,
saw the ‘paperwork’ (and particularly the recording of ‘contacts’) primarily
as a means of protecting themselves if something were to ‘go wrong’:
It’s a back covering exercise. I don’t know how helpful it is to the young person
. . . . It’s about what’ll happen to me because I haven’t recorded it or I haven’t told
that person. It’s not really because that person will then get a beating from their
boyfriend although it should be. It’s about ‘well it says here in your riskmanagement
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plan that you would do that regardless of whether someone’s been beaten up’, but
that will be used obviously. It’ll be like ‘well this is what’s happened but you failed
to manage your plan, you failed to do this, you failed to do that’. (Practitioner,
Site A)
However, as this manager acknowledged, some incidents may not be pre-
ventable, especially if frontline workers struggle to recognise or respond
quickly to unexpected crises:
The red flags are the things that you can predict. So there are some things that
you’ll never be able to predict, it’ll just happen . . . I mean I think a lot of the
time we’re very good at assessing risk but sometimes it’s a question of certain sets
of circumstances which happen all at once and it just pushes that person over the
edge, whatever that means. (Manager, Site B)
A more generalised professional anxiety was also visible in the integrated
service where staff had been required to take on youth justice work with
limited training (and sometimes amongst those responsible for ‘gatekeep-
ing’ their work):
I’m constantly on edge to be ‘have I done it all right?’ ’cause I don’t want to be the
one that gets kicked out because I’ve done it wrong. (Practitioner, Site B)
More experienced practitioners also shared concerns that some of the peer
support mechanisms which had previously facilitated ‘on-the-job’ training
and supplemented supervision of challenging cases had been eroded by
the rapidly-changing organisational contexts discussed above:
Now that the team is significantly smaller . . . sometimes there’s maybe one other
person in the office so there’s not as many opportunities to get a cross section
of opinions. I think everybody is still really supportive if somebody’s struggling.
(Practitioner, Site A)
Gatekeeping [that is, checking the quality of ‘paperwork’ and offering feedback]
that is anything but face to face is really, really difficult, and I have learnt to stamp
my feet a bit . . . . Sometimes it’s about me moving and sometimes it’s about the
other person moving because, yeah, I can give you feedback on the phone but then
we’re talking about which line of the report and anyway that’s not really what, it’s
not about proof-reading, it needs to be a discussion. So I think there’s been practical
difficulties [when we are] no longer in the same building and some concerns about
how you maintain the level of expertise as time goes on. (Manager, Site B)
These changes were not absolute: we were told of continuing peer support,
successful supervision by senior practitioners and opportunities for group
discussion of cases at both sites, as well as developments such as ‘prac-
tice improvement’ posts intended to identify potential issues and support
frontline workers. Nonetheless, the central importance of collaborative and
supportive peer networks for initial training and ongoing development was
widely emphasised by staff at all levels, which parallel systems of quality
assurance – and particularly depersonalised forms of ‘gatekeeping’ – could
not adequately replace.
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Destandardisation and (Practitioner) Discretion
Recent changes to the National Standards for Youth Justice Services (Youth
Justice Board 2013) suggest a partial relaxing of standardisation (see
Drake, Fergusson and Briggs (2014) for discussion). Increased flexibility is
reflected, for example, in changes to requirements relating to compliance
and breach. Section 8.15 of the most recent revision requires that ‘any de-
cisions not to refer the matter to court or panel under breach proceedings,
where this is otherwise warranted by a pattern of non-compliance, are ap-
proved by a manager and properly recorded’ (Youth Justice Board 2013,
p.30). This contrasts with the more rigid 2010 standards which outlined
clear rules and timescales for when practitioners must initiate breach pro-
ceedings (Youth Justice Board 2010, pp.64–5) and stated in Section 8.7,
that YOTmanagers should stay breach only ‘in exceptional circumstances’,
with a requirement to ‘record this fully with justifying reasons on the child
or young person’s file’ (Youth Justice Board 2010, p.62). As with pre-court
interventions, this appears to formalise existing decisions: frontline practi-
tioners at both sites gave examples of where they had sought exceptions to
breach proceedings (as below), and one site had revised their local policies.
Greater tolerance for variation is also reflected in the area of risk assess-
ment: controversial scoring has also been removed from the new AssetPlus
tool and practitioners will be able to use their ‘professional judgement
to contribute to the final likelihood of reoffending rating’ (Youth Justice
Board 2014, p.14).
What remain in place are most of the deadlines for the completion of
tasks set out within National Standards. This is significant given many
frontline practitioners told us about the range of performance manage-
ment measures in place to secure compliance with these deadlines and
to track progress against other locally determined performance indicators.
Careworks automatically flags when work governed by National Standards
is overdue (for example, initial meetings are required to take place within
three days of a court hearing when a court order is made, and plans result-
ing from assessments must be completed within 15 days of the initiation of
an assessment), and managers were able to track the progress of individual
staff members against these prescribed deadlines. Managers at both sites
also ‘audited’ samples of cases to check that all required documentation
was adequately completed in a timely manner.
There was considerable pressure to meet deadlines and follow proce-
dures governed byNational Standards, although it was apparent that there
was some space for discretion here too. Sometimes this was due to indi-
vidual prioritisation of tasks: one of the practitioners we interviewed, for
example, described how it ‘boiled her piss’ to see colleagues take young
people engaged in education out of the classroom during school hours in
order to meet the deadlines prescribed by National Standards, and a num-
ber of staff told us that they refused to prioritise deadlines. Most commonly,
however, this followed an application to a manager to ‘authorise’ missed
deadlines for the completion of ‘paperwork’ or a decision not to comply
with National Standards in other areas, such as compliance and breach:
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If there’s an issue where we need to discuss that because we need to veer away
from National Standards, or we need to make a decision on lack of engagement
or breach, then I’ll have those conversations with the case manager, we’ll reach a
decision which is mutual I think, based on what they’re saying, based on what I
think ought to happen, but that’s balanced out against any perceived risk. So if
there’s a risk to anybody then it’s going to influence our decision. (Manager, Site A)
If it’s a statutory appointment and they don’t attend, yes, that’s what happens: you
send the warning. But we always write in the warning ‘if you’ve got a valid reason
for that absence you need to provide evidence within seven days’ and then there
would be that option of discussing it with the manager, do we think that the fact
that they’d been knocked off their bike was acceptable. If that’s the case we’ll write
to them and say ‘this counts as an acceptable absence’. It gets wiped. (Practitioner,
Site B)
The new pre-court (that is, diversion) work was governed by fewer pre-
scribed standards. One manager we spoke to felt this could be ‘hugely
innovative and free’, and allow staff to focus on ‘building a relationship’
with young people rather than ‘locking horns’. This was, indeed, reflected
by some staff assessments of the new interventions, although we also found
some evidence of ’system-creep’, where workers imported aspects of post-
court work to the new pre-court services (see Kelly and Armitage 2015).
One aspect of this was apparent at Site A, where we were told that a mir-
ror system for monitoring the timely completion of paperwork had been
introduced within pre-court services:
Pre-court we have a lot less of the deadlines, structures etc. in place that post court
have. The quality standards, inverted commas, and the ones that we do have are
the ones we’ve decided to import from our colleagues. (Manager, Site A)
Fascinatingly, the voluntarily adopted target given as an example appeared
to be unachievable, since it was reportedly never met (‘at the moment we’re
not even getting close’). Meanwhile at Site B, a practitioner told us of a
‘joke’ within the service following a communication from a senior manager
which claimed that the organisation no longer worked to targets but also
emphasised the importance of ‘criteria’ being met.
A Transformation of Accountability
When asked about the distinction that many professionals felt existed be-
tween meeting the needs of young people and meeting the needs of the
service to have its performance measured and to be auditable, one senior
manager explained it this way:
The way I try and get it across in this service, and in common with many other
services in the country, is we needed to get people to record better than they ever
did do for monitoring purposes, for inspection purposes, if it isn’t recorded it didn’t
happen purposes. We needed to evidence it. And we needed to improve the quality
of data that we got to be able to manage the service, to know what we were doing in
terms of reoffending and all that stuff. So we banged on and on and on and on and
on and on and on about feeding the beast, and not surprisingly, . . . the distinction
between the proper work and the admin stuff . . . , the wall just got bigger and
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bigger and bigger between the two, and stronger and thicker and so on. (Senior
Manager)
Indeed, we were also told that a reduction in centralised reporting require-
ments (Youth Justice Board 2011) had caused few noticeable changes in
demands for information at the local level:
What the YJB used to give us was a set of counting rules and a huge number of
tables that we submitted to them on virtually everything . . . . We’ve all gone to local
measures and they marketed it as reducing the burden on us but in fact we still
need to be recording all of the same things and because our management boards
and team management teams etc., have been used to seeing this information they
still wanted to see the information so we were still having to produce it all locally.
(Manager, Site B)
This supports the recent speculation by Drake, Fergusson and Briggs
(2014) that:
Far from advancing in lock step, increased localisation is in principle capable of
reducing practitioner discretion. It has the potential to generate small-scale cen-
tralism, whereby newly empowered local managers replace the paraphernalia of
centralist controls with their own closely monitored strictures. (p.26)
Thus, while the introduction of local controls appears contrary to the cur-
rent direction of travel of the YJB (which is arguably moving back from
‘must’ to ‘should’ after relaxing some requirements in the most recent
iteration of National Standards), there is less contradiction when manage-
rial accounts (and frontline accounts of managers) are considered. When
considering the benefits of recording decisions and decision makers to lo-
cal bureaucracies, the ‘janus-faced’ nature of all youth justice work, and
not only frontline work, becomes clearly apparent. Youth justice services
were understood by many to be competing for recognition locally and na-
tionally, with senior managers keen to secure favourable assessments not
only by the YJB, but by local political actors such as local councillors, the
local authority executive and the magistracy and judiciary. We were also
told that favourable assessments by HM Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP)
were particularly important, not only in providing some form of external
validation, but as a means of securing the local reputation of the service, its
political position within the local authority and thus its continued funding
position:
I mean, the holy book is the HMIP criteria, which I don’t know if you’ve had a
look through those at all for the inspection? And while they’re a pain if you’re being
blunt, they do actually give you a very clear idea of what’s regarded as good practice
. . . . We could think we’re effective in terms of outcomes for young people as much
as we like but if HMIP come and say ‘no, you’re performing dreadfully’ then [the
senior managers] are out of a job. (Senior Manager)
[Head of Service] is really good with that stuff and has [raised our profile] with the
YJB and with [local authority] and our Management Boards certainly. Politically to
me it looks . . . the height of stupidity to start cutting away something that’s showing
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as working and has been seen as good practice within an organisation because you
need to make cuts. (Manager)
Could we be taken to court for not following the law? I don’t know. I’ve never
really thought about it in those terms. I’ve thought more in terms of actually if
we don’t have good relationships with courts, don’t have good relationships with
police, don’t have good relationships with YJB, don’t impress the Inspectors, then
outcomes for young people are likely to be worse. (Senior Manager)
If future funding (and their own jobs) are believed to depend on being
able to demonstrate continual service improvement to local political mas-
ters in the context of declining resources across all children’s services, it
is counter-intuitive for senior managers to reduce performance informa-
tion, or to run the risk of a poor inspection or serious case review after
informally overseeing a reduction in standards around recording or time-
keeping.However,managers at all levels also acknowledged that the weight
of information demands in youth justice risk undermining the ‘real work’
of the service (in the memorable words of one participant – ‘you don’t
make a pig fatter by weighing it’).
Conclusion
Within social work, where there is no central bureaucratic equivalent of the
YJB, the critique of managerialism is primarily formulated with reference
to local management as well as outside regulatory bodies such as theHealth
and Care Professions Council. This has encouraged greater analysis of
tensions within occupational hierarchies. Rogowski (2012), for example,
forcefully suggests that the social work profession has been degraded into ‘a
so-called profession with managers now dominating what practitioners do’
(p.921). The problematic concept of ‘professionalism’ is still more difficult
when applied to youth justice due to its multi-agency basis, diversity of
access routes and lack of professional registration (for example, Hester
2010). When understood as a synonym for agentic practitioner, however,
our data point to a need to analyse shifts in ‘the balance of power, not the
elimination of professional power’ (Evans and Harris 2004, p.892) within
local bureaucracies.
Our fieldwork occurred at a time when decisions taken by youth justice
professionals, in the context of shifting economic and political conditions,
had encouraged rapid and fairly radical changes to the organisation of
local youth justice services. This was particularly apparent at Site B, which
hadmoved to an integratedmodel of provision; however, the management
team at Site A had also restructured the service in the face of significant
budget cuts. The importance of ‘professional judgment’ and ‘discretion’
as a means for determining responses to young people in trouble with
the law had also been re-emphasised within revised National Standards
(Youth Justice Board 2013) and within the revised standardised assess-
ment tool, AssetPlus (Youth Justice Board 2014). We have argued, how-
ever, that it is crucial to distinguish between ‘managerial’ and ‘practitioner’
discretion when considering the impact of standardised processes and
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nationally-specified requirements on decision making. Despite expressed
managerial support and dedicated local initiatives such as practice im-
provement officers or ‘surgeries’ staffed by experienced practitioners, a
number of frontline workers interviewed for this study struggled to envis-
age a situation where they could ‘say no’ and challenge rules or standard
operating procedures within the service. When this did occur, (middle)
managerial support was commonly reported as a necessary condition for
the exercise of ‘practitioner discretion’. We were also told that reporting
requirements had not been reduced by decentralisation since information
demands introduced by the YJB now proved useful to local managers
and/or those further up the hierarchy.
In this article, we have argued that the day-to-day realities of youth
justice work and the outcomes of such work are shaped by ‘centralisation’,
‘standardisation’ or ‘discretion’ but not solely, exclusively, or in an over-
determined fashion. The political realm does play a determining role in
youth justice practice via its transformation of ‘accountability’, but, as the
data above demonstrate, agentic practitioners at different levels within
and across youth justice agencies and organisation also have a part to play
(see also Phoenix 2016). The data also demonstrate that other non-youth
justice agencies and actors also have influence, particularly when it comes
to shifting the locus of control. Less centralisation and less standardisation
have certainly brought local authorities and local government much closer
in shaping youth justice work ‘on the ground’, if only because of the effect
it has on transforming ‘accountability’. Practitioners remain accountable
for their youth justice practice and work. Managers, however, become ever
more accountable for the outcomes of their teams – and to a wider range of
actors and organisations, albeit at the local political level, than recent youth
justice scholarship has commonly discussed.7
Notes
1 There was no single definition of ‘practice’ articulated by practitioners in this study.
Some believed practice encompassed all roles performed, while others felt it mainly
related to the face-to-face work.
2 Hereafter ‘practitioners’, but practitioners covers probation officers, social workers,
youth workers, health workers, teachers, police, and others who had come up through
the original YOTs. The interviewees worked across all levels, including service leads,
senior managers, officers, and sessional workers.
3 ‘Contacts’ could include verbal exchanges, meetings, phone calls, text messages, or
emails.
4 The Youth Crime Action Plan 2008 (HM Government 2008) pledged to reduce the
numbers of young people entering the youth justice system. The controversial police
‘offences brought to justice’ target was revised to place more emphasis on serious
crimes in 2008 and removed in 2010.
5 Such expansion seems likely to increase. At the time of writing, Kate Morris, Di-
rector of Operations at the YJB, was encouraging YOTs to consider ‘opportunities
for alternative funding streams’ in the face of new budget cuts (Youth Justice Board
2016).
6 While this article focuses on the distinction made between ‘paperwork’ and the ‘real
work’ made by some of our sample, the project as a whole considered the multiple
roles performed by youth justice workers.
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7 Acknowledgements: The research on which this article is based was funded by the Eco-
nomic and Social Research Council (ES/J009857/1 and ES/J009857/2).
References
Audit Commission (1996) Misspent Youth: Young People and Crime, Abingdon: Audit Com-
mission Publications.
Baker, K. (2005) ‘Assessment in youth justice: professional discretion and the use of
Asset’, Youth Justice, 5(2), 106–22.
Bateman, T. (2011) ‘“We now breach more kids in a week than we used to in a whole
year”: the punitive turn, enforcement and custody’, Youth Justice, 11, 115–33.
Bateman, T. (2014) ‘Where has all the youth crime gone? Youth justice in an age of
austerity’, Children and Society, 28, 416–24.
Broadhurst, K., Hall, C., Wastell, D., White, S. and Pithouse, A. (2010) ‘Risk, instru-
mentalism and the humane project in social work: identifying the informal logics of
risk management in children’s statutory services’, British Journal of Social Work, 40,
1046–64.
Burnett, R. and Appleton, C. (2004) ‘Joined-up services to tackle youth crime: a case-
study in England’, British Journal of Criminology, 44, 34–54.
Byrne, B. and Brooks, K. (2015) Post-YOT Youth Justice. (Howard League What is Justice?
Working Papers 19/2015). Available at: http://howardleague.org/research/what-is-justice-re-
imagining-penal-policy/what-is-justice-working-papers (accessed 29 July 2016).
Canton, R. and Eadie, T. (2008) ‘Accountability, legitimacy and discretion: applying
criminology in professional practice’, in: B. Stout, J. Yates and B. Williams (Eds.),
Applied Criminology, London: Sage.
Carlile, A. (2014) Independent Parliamentarians’ Inquiry into the Operation and Ef-
fectiveness of the Youth Court. Available at: http://www.ncb.org.uk/media/1148432/
independent_parliamentarians__inquiry_into_the_operation_and_effectiveness_of_
the_youth_court.pdf (accessed 29 July 2016).
Case, S. and Haines, K. (2015) ‘Risk management and early intervention: a critical anal-
ysis’, in: B. Goldson and J. Muncie (Eds.), Youth Crime and Justice, 2nd edn, London:
Sage.
Clarke, J. and Newman, J. (1997) The Managerial State: Power, Politics and Ideology in the
Remaking of Social Welfare, London: Sage.
Drake, D.H., Fergusson, R. and Briggs, D.B. (2014) ‘Hearing new voices: re-viewing
youth justice policy through practitioners’ relationships with young people’, Youth
Justice, 14, 22–39.
Eadie, T. and Canton, R. (2002) ‘Practising in a context of ambivalence: the challenge
for youth justice workers’, Youth Justice, 2, 14–26.
Evans, T. and Harris, J. (2004) ‘Street-level bureaucracy, social work and the (exagger-
ated) death of discretion’, British Journal of Social Work, 34, 871–95.
Field, S. (2007) ‘Practice cultures and the “new” youth justice in (England and) Wales’,
British Journal of Criminology, 47, 311–30.
Field, S. (2015) ‘Developing local cultures in criminal justice policy-making: the case of
youth justice in Wales’, in: M. Wasik and S. Santatzoglou (Eds.), The Management of
Change in Criminal Justice: Who Knows Best?, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fielder, C., Hart, D. and Shaw, C. (2008) The Developing Relationship between
Youth Offending Teams and Children’s Trusts. Available at: http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/id/eprint/
7998 (accessed 29 July 2016).
Goldson, B. (Ed.) (2000) The New Youth Justice, Lyme Regis: Russell House.
Harrison, S. and Smith, C. (2003) ‘Neo-bureaucracy and public management: the case
of medicine in the National Health Service’, Competition & Change, 7, 243–54.
493
C© 2016 The Howard League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Howard Journal Vol 55 No 4. December 2016
ISSN 2059-1098, pp. 478–495
Hester, R. (2010) ‘Professional education in youth justice:mirror ormotor’,British Journal
of Community Justice, 8, 45–56.
HM Government (2008) Youth Crime Action Plan 2008, London: HM Government.
HM Government (2014) Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, London: The Stationery
Office.
Home Office (1997) No More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in England
and Wales, Cmnd. 3809.
House of Commons (2016) Home Affairs Committee, Police and Crime Commissioners: Here to
Stay, Seventh Report of Session 2015–16, London: House of Commons.
Hughes, N. (2009) ‘Managerialism subverted? Exploring the activity of youth justice
practitioners’, in: M. Barnes and D. Prior (Eds.), Subversive Citizens: Power, Agency and
Resistance in Public Services, Bristol: Policy Press.
Innes, D. and Tetlow, G. (2015) Central Cuts, Local Decision Making: Changes in Local
Government Spending and Revenues in England, 2009–10 to 2014–15, London: Institute
for Fiscal Studies.
Kelly, L. and Armitage, V. (2015) ‘Diverse diversions: youth justice reform, localized
practices, and a “new interventionist diversion”’?, Youth Justice, 15, 117–33.
Kemshall, H., Parton, N., Walsh, M. and Waterson, J. (1997) ‘Concepts of risk in relation
to organizational structure and functioning within the personal social services and
probation’, Social Policy & Administration, 31, 213–32.
Lipsky, M. (1980) Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services,
New York, NY.: Russell Sage Foundation.
Mawby, R.C. and Worrall, A. (2013) Doing Probation Work: Identity in a Criminal Justice
Occupation, London: Routledge.
McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J. and Hughes, G. (2001) ‘The permanent revolution: New
Labour, new public management and the modernization of criminal justice’, Crimi-
nology and Criminal Justice, 1(3), 301–18.
Ministry of Justice (2012) Swift and Sure Justice: The Government’s Plans for Reform of the
Criminal Justice System, Cmnd. 8388.
Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board (2013) Youth Out-of-Court Disposals: Guide for
Police and Youth Offending Services, London: Youth Justice Board.
Morris, R. (2015) ‘“Youth justice practice is just messy” – youth offending team practi-
tioners: culture and identity’, British Journal of Community Justice, 13, 45–57.
Phoenix, J. (2016) ‘Against youth justice and youth governance, for youth penality’,
British Journal of Criminology, 56, 123–40.
Pitts, J. (2001) ‘Korrectional karaoke:NewLabour and the zombification of youth justice’,
Youth Justice, 1, 3–16.
Prior, D. and Mason, P. (2010) ‘A different kind of evidence? Looking for “what works”
in engaging young offenders’, Youth Justice, 10, 211–26.
Rogowski, S. (2012) ‘Social work with children and families: challenges and possibilities
in the neo-liberal world’, British Journal of Social Work, 42, 921–40.
Smith, R. (2014) ‘Re-inventing diversion’, Youth Justice, 14, 109–21.
Souhami, A. (2007) Transforming Youth Justice: Occupational Identity and Cultural Change,
Cullompton: Willan.
Souhami, A. (2015) ‘Creating the Youth Justice Board: policy and policy making
in English and Welsh youth justice’, Criminology and Criminal Justice, 15, 152–
68.
Taylor, C. (2016) Review of the Youth Justice System: An Interim Report of Emerging
Findings. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/498736/youth-justice-review.pdf (accessed 29 July 2016).
Wilson, E. and Hinks, S. (2011) Assessing the Predictive Validity of the Asset Youth
Risk Assessment Tool Using the Juvenile Cohort Study (JCS) (Ministry of Justice
494
C© 2016 The Howard League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Howard Journal Vol 55 No 4. December 2016
ISSN 2059-1098, pp. 478–495
Research Series 10/11). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/217365/assessing-predictive-validity.pdf (accessed 29 July 2016).
Youth Justice Board (2000) National Standards for Youth Justice, London: Youth Justice
Board.
Youth Justice Board (2010) National Standards for Youth Justice Services, London: Youth
Justice Board.
Youth Justice Board (2011) YJB Corporate and Business Plan 2011/12–2014/15.
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
356551/yjb_corporate_plan_2011_2015_business_plan_2011_2012.pdf (accessed 29 July
2016).
Youth Justice Board (2013) National Standards for Youth Justice Services. London: Youth
Justice Board.
Youth Justice Board (2014) Assessment and Planning Interventions Framework: As-
setPlus, Model Document. Version 1.1. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/364092/AssetPlus_Model_Document_
1_1_October_2014.pdf (accessed 29 July 2016).
Youth Justice Board (2015) Youth Offending Teams: Making the Difference for Chil-
dren and Young People, Victims and Communities. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445271/Board_Visits_
Final_Report.pdf (accessed 29 July 2016).
Youth Justice Board (2016) YJ Bulletin, Issue 55, 22 April 2016. Avail-
able at: http://youthjusticeboard.newsweaver.co.uk/yots2/1qj25advi7en6qz9xo0ho5?email=
true&a=11&p=50170736 (accessed 29 July 2016).
Date submitted: May 2016
Date accepted: July 2016
495
C© 2016 The Howard League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
